Making sense: A reconstruction of people's understandings of the European constitutional referendum in the Netherlands

CHRISTIAN BADEN and CLAES H. de VREESE

Abstract

This article investigates how voters made sense of the Dutch EU constitutional referendum. Based on a series of focus group interviews, it identifies what information people based their understandings on, and traces the relations they draw between concepts in their own accounts of their vote choices. Applying a cognitive connectionist perspective on the construction of meaning, it models people's considerations as paths across semantic networks. It finds that people shared considerable parts of the knowledge underlying their constructions, but used this information quite differently. They strategically selected frames from their information environment, and reframed contrary arguments to fit their constructions. Yes- and No-voters drew in systematically different additional information, while simultaneously engaging idiosyncratic concerns to personalize their accounts. People's understandings are thus informed and constrained, but by no means determined, by public discourse. Highlighting people's activity and creativity, this paper calls for a stronger audience perspective in political communication research.

Keywords: cognitive mapping, European constitution, referendum, schema construction, sense making

Introduction

The world of politics is complicated. Generally, increasing complexity of interactions, indeterminacy of expectations, and immense information demands characterize most aspects of contemporary society. However, unlike other domains, the need to understand politics is not limited to a few educated experts. In democratic societies, every citizen is called upon to judge political developments and proposals (Kuklinski and Quirk, 2000). This challenging task becomes even more daunting in popular

referenda. First, issues selected for direct voting are usually those entailing most far-reaching consequences, which are hard to estimate even for specialists. Second, heuristics such as party cues provide less guidance in referenda (Hobolt, 2007; de Vreese and Semetko, 2004). Both are particularly true for the referendum on the Draft European Constitution, held in the Netherlands on June 1, 2005 (Aarts and van der Kolk, 2005).

Unsurprisingly, research has found that people are usually unable to grasp the intricate details of political happenings. Knowledge about even basic political facts is low; awareness of issues and problems rises and falls with media attention, and attitudes seem to be not half as stable and reasoned as one might prefer (Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). Due to even lower knowledge of supranational politics, scholars questioned the very existence of citizens' attitudes towards European politics (Franklin, Marsh, and Wlezien, 1994; Svensson, 2002). Yet, a growing body of literature shows that, under certain circumstances, people can still arrive at surprisingly consistent, change-resistant (Brewer and Gross, 2005; Druckman, 2001; Druckman and Nelson, 2003) and 'rational' judgments (Gabel, 1998; Karp, Bowler, and Garland, 2005, Hobolt, 2007). Despite all their lacking resources, citizens somehow manage to make their own sense of political happenings (Popkin, 1991; de Vreese and Semetko, 2004). Exactly how people use information to construct meaning, however, is unknown (Berinsky and Kinder, 2006; Scheuer, 2005).

This paper contributes to filling this gap by mapping those schemata people use to grasp a political phenomenon as remote as the European Constitutional Process. It reconstructs how people use information available from media and societal discourse selectively and creatively for their own purposes. Furthermore, by shedding light also on the contributions of people's idiosyncratic goals and concerns to political information processing, it thus complements current research in political communication effects with an audience perspective (Mishler, 1986; Schaap, 2006).

In order to provide a rigorous model of people's sense making, the paper develops a network-based approach to the analysis of people's accounts. Applying the connectionist view of comprehension advanced in cognitive and social psychology (van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983; Raaijmakers and Shiffrin, 1992; Schaap, 2006), it models considerations as paths in a semantic network. Apart from its capability to formalize and treat rich context and data, this approach also provides a unified platform to link different views on context-sensitive understanding, most notably research in framing, schematic processing, and social representations.

Theory

In their review of the Dutch referendum campaign, Aarts and van der Kolk (2005) conclude that the debate had been less concerned with different preferences or evaluations, but rather with completely different interpretations of what the referendum was all about (see also Fossum and Trenz, 2006). In their view, Yes-voters understood the draft constitution mainly as a consolidation and summary of existing accomplishments. No-voters, by contrast, interpreted the Constitution as another important step towards some vision of Europe they loathed (see also de Vreese and Semetko, 2004). They constructed entirely different understandings of the situation confronting them (Kintsch, 1998; Mishler, 1986; van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983), integrated available information in different ways, and consequently answered different questions when voting in the referendum (Milner, 2006). This study tries to reconstruct these understandings, and to identify what differences people made in using the information provided to them. Therefore, it is necessary to review briefly what is already known about people's construction of meaning.

Construction of understanding and schema building

When building an understanding of what is happening, people seek to connect bits of provided information. They put evidence into relation with other information they perceive to be relevant, (Brewer and Gross, 2005; Graber, 1988), using their experiential knowledge, or drawing upon popular wisdom and public discourse (Gamson, 1992; Haste, 1992; Schaap, 2006). Thus, they model new information and prior knowledge into belief systems, which are at least superficially coherent, and account for the received information (Converse, 1964; Fiske and Kinder, 1981; Graber, 1988; Iyengar, 1990; Pennington and Hastie, 1988).

People tend to prefer understandings that are relatively parsimonious, suggest unique evaluations, and are thus easy-to-handle guides for behavior. In order to reduce the complexity of information included in their understandings, they use information highly selectively. Evidence is filtered upon reception, disregarding information that is seen as non-credible, inconsequential, or simply not connected (Gamson, 1992; Raaijmakers and Shiffrin, 1992). Processing and storage of information is highly synthetic, abstracting and memorizing only the perceived 'gist' of processed information (Graber, 1988). Finally, information is linked to stored knowledge selectively, following cues. What knowledge is regarded as applicable depends on the schemata formed in prior construction processes (Conover and Feldman, 1984; van Gorp, 2007; Graber, 1988). Schemata are conceptualized as relatively stable subsets of knowl-

edge which group considerations commonly activated together, and can be referred to as wholes (van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983; Graber, 1988; Scheufele, 2006). They can be charged with valence, thus simplifying their use in evaluation tasks (Scheufele, 2004; de Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2003). Resisting change, schemata thus allow forming stable attitudes towards the contained understandings (Matthes, 2007). Schemata can overlap, group information by almost any criterion, and appear at almost any level of abstraction (Conover and Feldman, 1984). Storing constructed understandings as schemata in memory, and people accumulate and structure knowledge to feed subsequent sense making processes (Berinsky and Kinder, 2006).

Cue based processing and framing

In most cases, simply matching information with stored knowledge is insufficient to decide which out of several related schemata are relevant (Graber, 1988; Holyoak and Thagard, 1995; Schaap, 2006; Shah et al., 2004). Context is needed to move beyond denotational understanding, and select what stored knowledge new information is integrated with (Asch, 1952; Neuman, Just, and Crigler, 1992; Raaijmakers and Shiffrin, 1992; Shah et al., 2004). This process is commonly known as framing. By virtue of being embedded in specific semantic contexts, provided information suggests certain schematic structures as most appropriate for processing (Berinsky and Kinder, 2006; Valkenburg, Semetko, and de Vreese, 1999; de Vreese and Semetko, 2004). Frames are semantic structures that make certain aspects of reality more salient than others. The selection of aspects implies some "central organizing idea or story line" and thereby "provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them" (Gamson and Modigliani, 1987, p. 143). Following this organizing idea, people can identify applicable schemata. Framing thus selects from a range of possible contexts, and thus suggests how information should be related to other evidence and knowledge (Matthes, 2007). Framing thus shapes how schematic understanding evolves (Berinsky and Kinder, 2006; Druckman, 2001; Neuman et al., 1992; Scheufele, 2004; Shen, 2004).

This function of frames has been described also from an aggregate level perspective in the study of social representations. This theory holds that certain understandings become popularized in a society and culture, and form a repertoire of frames commonly available to its members (Axelrod, 1973; Brewer and Gross, 2005; Moscovici, 1961, van Gorp, 2007). Social representations build mainly through mediatized public discourse, which ensures both a wide distribution and relatively coherent structure of interpretations. Common understandings spread and be-

come objectified as cultural knowledge (Doise, Clemence, and Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993; Moscovici, 1961; Schaap, Renckstorf, and Wester, 2005b). Social representations are neither static nor deterministic (Doise et al., 1993; van Gorp, 2007). They organize multiple frames, a core set of which is relatively stable and widely shared, while other parts may vary and shift across constituencies. Also, contrary and competing frames can co-exist in a culture's social representations, although coherence requirements tend to limit the presence of directly opposing frames within the same representation (see also Chong, 1996; Edy and Meirick, 2007; Kumlin, 2000; van Gorp, 2007). To the degree that people share common understandings, they are thus expected to organize their considerations into similarly structured schemata, and put these into relation utilizing similar kinds of frames.

Idiosyncrasy, values, and prior beliefs

Neither social representations nor message frames determinate information processing (Neuman et al., 1992). On the one hand, particularly in political communication, multiple, often competing frames are provided simultaneously (Chong and Druckman, 2007; Fossum and Trenz, 2006; Shah et al., 2004). People may follow cues selectively, or process information in relation to more than one context to enhance the integration of their schematic understanding (Edy and Meirick, 2007; Iyengar, 1990; Kinder, 1998; Neuman et al., 1992). They may accept frames as more or less persuasive, disregard or counter argue frames. People thus enjoy considerable discretion in how they model their understandings (Druckman, 2001). On the other hand, people are capable of making knowledge relevant to provided information even if no frame suggests they should do so (van Gorp, 2007). This is particularly the case if people hold strong predispositions and beliefs (Brewer and Gross, 2005; Chong, 1996): Individual experiences and convictions may highlight specific implications of provided information, while others would not make this connection unaided (Shen, 2004). Furthermore, where their core beliefs are concerned, people are both more motivated and well-equipped to construct meaning consciously. They may use their knowledge to discount, weigh, or counterargue frames, or even create their own frames. Thus, where people see information as related to beliefs they hold dear, these beliefs are likely to be an important resource in their sense making process.

Intentional construction and goal-directed biased processing

The third main influence in selective processing stems from intentional construction. As people form understandings, they often direct both

their search for, use of, and integration of information according to specific goals in sense making (Brewer and Gross, 2005; Haste, 1992; Holyoak and Thagard, 1995; Smith, 1994). Thus, information relevant to pursued goals is more likely to be used, regardless of provided cues and frames. In the given case, the need to form a dichotomous voting decision for the referendum increases the need to avoid ambiguity. Constructions are most useful if they unequivocally suggest either a positive or negative evaluation of the European Constitutional project. Moreover, the campaign context allows organizing provided information by the vote choice advocated by its authors. Thus, it becomes easier to identify information that might conflict with one's emerging situation model *ex ante*, and to discount its credibility based on the implied persuasive intent. The more people are leaning towards either side, the less likely will they accept opposing information, and the easier can they avoid it.

Once a decision is cast, coherence of considerations can be easily crafted by discounting the other camp's arguments, and selectively accepting further information. While people should generally know arguments advanced by either side, they should highlight information supporting their decision, and suppress doubts they might have had. They may refer to contrary considerations as well, presenting their decision as carefully weighted and well informed. However, they would be expected to explain also why these thoughts had been dismissed in casting a decision.

Expectations for individuals' understandings

Summing up, these dynamics of sense making point to three main influences which form people's acquired understanding. First, culturally proliferated frames provide a broad basis indicating how a phenomenon should be understood. People's constructions are expected to share a common core shaped by social representations, including connections and contexts recognized by nearly everyone. Second, idiosyncratic beliefs are an important resource in sense making. Therefore, individuals can be expected to deviate from cultural or media-promoted interpretations where their core beliefs are concerned. Third, people's constructions should show traces of enforcing coherence with one's voting decision. Arguments should be introduced selectively, and contrary considerations are expected to be explicitly discounted or discredited.

Together, shared social representations, idiosyncratic concerns and goal-directed construction are expected to capture the main forces structuring understandings. The distinctive patterns they imply for individuals' sense making should account for both coherence and divergence in people's accounts of the EU Constitutional Referendum. Other influ-

ences such as temporary primes, situative goals, or scattered media frames should remain minor disturbances, and become consequential only where they resonate with the other main dynamics. Gathering data of the achieved understandings about a year after the actual referendum, in a period preceded by very low coverage of European politics, this study focuses on the core of people's constructed schemata.

Case

This study looks for patterns in people's understandings that indicate which of the above resources have been used in sense making (Gamson, 1992; Schaap, 2006). Selecting the European constitutional referendum as a case study mainly serves to reduce the range of resources available for sense making while maintaining a real life non-experimental setting. The focusing of public attention towards the referendum provides a homogenous incentive for using available information to arrive at a dichotomous choice. Focusing on accounts of voting decisions thus constrains the range of pursued construction goals. At the same time, the novelty and unobtrusiveness of the subject severely limits the use of experiential knowledge, and restricts the crucial information sources to the brief campaign period preceding the referendum (Iyengar, 1990; de Vreese and Semetko, 2004). Additional data drawn in from the ASCoR EU Constitution Referendum Study (see Schuck and de Vreese, 2008, for details) provides a grip on the main topics saliently present in the media campaign. The other likely main resources for sense making, popular wisdom and prior experiential or media-proliferated knowledge (Gamson, 1992), are relatively simply structured and have been described in previous research. Chiefly, these concern beliefs about (personal/national) economic benefits from EU integration (Gabel, 1998), evaluations of domestic politics (Franklin et al., 1994), as well as a range of common EU-stereotypes underlying general European attitudes (Aarts and van der Kolk, 2005; Hewstone, 1986; Hobolt, 2007; Medrano, 2003; Scheuer, 2005; Svensson, 2002). Thus, in most cases, people's understandings of the EU Draft Constitution have to be constructed from a constrained set of ingredients. By contrast, representations of national politics draw upon so many different sources that distinguishing patterns is hardly possible.

Method

Approach

So far, theories of sense making and comprehension have sketched out a range of mechanisms that plausibly account for discovered mental processes *ex post*. Given well-defined, low complexity stimuli, and experi-

mental conditions, some approaches also make probabilistic predictions about people's responses. None of these, however, are capable of predicting what schemata people will construct in real world high complexity conditions (Bennett, 1993). Preexisting knowledge, complex environments, sporadic attention to uncounted information sources, and many more uncontrollable, but highly consequential disturbances interfere. The formation of well-specified expectations about people's acquired understandings of the European Draft constitution is impossible.

However, all mentioned approaches share a view of sense making that can be represented in connectionist network models of meaning and memory (Read, Vanman, and Miller, 1997). They specify formal patterns that are expected in constructed meanings, regardless of their content. This study uses the existing theories to formulate an approach treating sense-making data in accordance with the structures that were supposedly responsible for its creation. It maps the connections made between concepts, and looks for patterns that correspond to the formations suggested in theory (Axelrod, 1973; Doise et al., 1933; Haste, 1992; Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland, 1992; Schaap, 2006). It substantively performs a qualitative analysis, based on highly formalized representations of the data. Thereby, it allows a deeper look than classic qualitative approaches. It avoids biases stemming from the analyst's preconceptions (Schaap et al., 2005a), and leaves the emergence of patterns to the rule-bound mapping procedure. The derived network representation not only highlights what connections are being made, but also which are *not*. Finally, despite all data reduction required for mapping, the context of statements is retained as adjacent regions in the network structure. Thus, the pursued approach allows a more systematic analysis than classic qualitative and ethnographic strategies (see also Höijer, 1990).

Setup

A series of interviews among four focus groups consisting of six persons each, were conducted in May 2006 at the premises of TNS/Nipo Veldkamp, Amsterdam. Each group was comprised of three Yes- and three No-voters, and was kept heterogeneous with respect to gender, political interest, and media use habits. Social group membership (students, white collar workers, blue collar workers, senior citizens) was kept homogenous within groups to facilitate discussion (Kitzinger, 1994; Lunt and Livingstone, 1996), and varied between groups to avoid capturing only one particular kind of discourse. Participants were told that the discussion would be about media use, so they were not primed about the investigated issue matter. All interviews lasted about 90 minutes, preceded by

a brief pre-test questionnaire collecting data on people's political interest, media use, and attitudes towards the European Union.

The interviews were conducted by a professional moderator, and observed by the researcher. The design of the questions was inspired by sense-making methodology as introduced by Dervin (1991/2001), and combined with techniques from mainstream focus group interviewing. Over the course of the interviews, questions became increasingly focused and pre-structured, involving both recall, explanation, inference, and projection tasks (Höijer, 1990; Kitzinger, 1994; Lunt and Livingstone, 1996; Neuman et al., 1992). Voicing disagreement and confusion was explicitly encouraged and probed for, and special care was taken not to let specific views or groups dominate the discussion. The complete moderators' guidelines, as well as the pre-test questionnaire, can be obtained from the author.

Data preparation

All interviews were transcribed, taking into account all verbal interactions. Nonverbal communication was ignored for the present study[1]. Actual statements were stripped from all filler utterances (e. g., 'you know', 'I mean', 'actually', etc.), redundancies, and expressions not made relevant[2] to the subject matter, following Grice (1975) and Kintsch (1998). Statements containing indirect speech and irony were rephrased to capture the semantic meaning of the participant's statement. Holyoak and Thagard's (1995) studies were used to identify and treat statements that used figurative and other paraphrasing speech.

All statements made by the participants were coded with respect to the semantic concepts raised. Concepts could be concrete entities (actors, objects, etc.), qualities and attributes (characteristics, goals, etc.), or abstract ideas (e. g., values, principles). The codes were derived by grouping descriptions that were used interchangeably (Spradley, 1979). If it was not entirely clear whether participants saw concepts as equivalent, separate codes were created. By the same token, the same word could be coded differently if participants used it in distinct ways, depending on the semantic focus (Kintsch, 1998; for instance, 'constitution' referred to different concepts[3]). Furthermore, word groups were considered as one concept if they could not be separated without affecting the semantic content of either component (Spradley, 1979)[4]. For instance, 'big countries' were sometimes treated as one type of actor, while in other instances some countries were merely qualified as 'big'.

For mapping in a propositional network[5], every statement was parsed into the contained propositions of the format [concept]−relation−[concept][6], following a procedure introduced by van Dijk and Kintsch (1983;

see also Kintsch, 1998; Schaap, 2006). Omitted referred-to concepts from preceding statements were filled in where required (Kintsch, 1998; Schaap et al., 2005a)[7]. However, this was only sparingly done to complete propositions with explicitly referenced concepts. Relationships between raised concepts were coded at the level of these dyads, discriminating between fourteen generic relationship types synthesized from the work of Spradley (1979) and Schaap et al. (2005a, 2005b; see also Collins and Loftus, 1975). Most of these types are directed relations (e. g., 'discontent caused the outcome' is different from 'the outcome caused discontent')[8]. Some other types are mutual, indicating that both participating concepts affect each other (e. g., 'opposition between national identities and a European superstate' implies 'national identities challenge a European superstate' and 'a European superstate challenges national identities'). A final kind is undirected, or lacks definition (e. g., 'currencies are associated with national identities'). Hierarchical relations (e. g., 'The Netherlands are an EU member state')[9], as well as modifiers (quality, time, location) are treated as directed relations. Most relationship types can occur as either associative or dissociative relations, which was distinguished in coding (Collins and Loftus, 1975; Read et al., 1997): For instance, in the sentence "I had worries about our identity" ([Self]−(possess)⇒[Worries]−(object)⇒[Identity]), either associative relationship can become dissociative by negation: "I was not worried about our identity" ([Self]−(not possess)⇒[Worries]−(object)⇒[Identity]), or "My worries were not about our identity" ([Self]−(possess)⇒[Worries]−(not object)⇒[Identity]).

Analysis

Based on the discussion questions and assigned codes, all statements concerning individual voting decisions and explanations of the referendum outcome were identified[10]. From these discussions, thematic maps were constructed capturing the (claimed) connectedness of issues, feelings and conclusions. The same procedure was repeated later for all statements discussing the role of the European common currency, which was selected for in-depth analysis due to its remarkable multifacetedness. Through the mapping procedure, four maps emerged; capturing statements related to the individual Yes- and No-vote[11], the referendum outcome, and the Euro, respectively. To reduce complexity, coded concepts were collapsed based on the functions performed in made arguments. Apart from semantic similarity, collapsible concepts needed to be reliably related to the same third concepts in the same way, or used interchangeably by participants in a specific discussion passage (Spradley, 1979). For instance, the information-quality codes 'unclear', 'little', and 'bad' were

collapsed if the point made referred to inadequate information provision. They were kept separate, however, when the discussion discriminated between 'good but insufficient', and 'bad and plenty' information. Within the reduced maps, thematic groups were identified based on interconnection density. A 'cluster' was defined as a subset of concepts where the neighbors of one concept were either directly connected themselves, or were connected through one more intermediary concept [12]. For instance, the concept 'arrogance' was linked to various governmental actors and actions, most of which were also interconnected amongst each other. Thus, a cluster labeled 'government arrogance' emerged. Based on the composition and arrangement of these clusters, the respective maps were compared, analyzing how patterns changed depending on the focus of discussion.

Subsequently, the construction patterns were examined by tracing mapped contributions back to their authors. Common themes were identified by looking for connections made by different participants, and across different focus groups. All statements were put into relation with the speakers' vote choice, seeking patterns associated with either camp. Finally, each participant's contributions were analyzed looking for recurring themes and patterns. For this, we compared the thematic ranges of participants' contributions to all drawn semantic networks. This comparison was further extended to the 20 most frequently coded concepts in a participant's contributions throughout the whole interview. These coded concepts were collapsed and clustered according to the same procedure as in mapping. Concepts repeatedly connected by the same participant were organized into idiosyncratic clusters.

Results

Clusters and relations in the semantic network

Before outlining how people constructed their understandings from shared beliefs and schemata, strategic goals and idiosyncratic concerns, it is first necessary to sketch the overall composure of the derived maps. All created maps could easily be organized into thematic clusters. Coded relationships discussed relations within a cluster, or made these relevant to other clusters and the target concepts, vote choice and referendum outcome. Within clusters, the predominant relationship types were actions, qualities, and object-relations. Between clusters, abstract associations prevailed, followed by relationships typical for specific clusters (e. g., the feelings cluster shows many inbound causality and outbound object-relations). Causality was most frequently expressed towards vote choices, as well as within certain clusters (mainly the euro cluster). Con-

nections between clusters were usually of the same kind, implying similar meanings. Clusters thus conformed to van Dijk and Kintsch's definition of schemata as "subsets of [a] network that can function as wholes" (1983: 47).

Clusters tended to group considerations with the same valence, with few contested exceptions. Considerations valenced one way were predominantly linked to similar considerations, while deviant interpretations remained rare. Where conflicting views existed about the same issue, contested linkages usually concerned relations between, not within clusters. For instance, positive considerations about the European economy clustered together with hopes for EU political power, whereas negative views formed a cluster together with complaints about overregulation and contribution costs. However, differently valenced clusters were often closely connected. Sometimes, clusters valenced one way were also made relevant to opposing vote choices. Most notably, one cluster criticizing provided information was frequently cited in relation to either voting decision. Particularly Yes-voting often appeared as weighted decision, considering also important contrary thoughts. Accounts of voting No were more homogenous. Explanations of the referendum outcome referred almost exclusively to negative clusters.

Clusters differ widely with respect to their internal complexity and integration with the rest of the discussion. For example, the two most densely integrated clusters discuss the behavior of the Dutch government and the quality of provided information, respectively. However, while the government cluster contains a range of different considerations and examples of arrogant, patronizing, and unprofessional behavior, the information cluster almost exclusively contains qualifications of information offers. At the same time, some other clusters are internally complex, but largely unrelated to anything else except vote choice (e. g., the power cluster).

Particularly large clusters are rarely covered in their entirety. Rather, there are subtle shifts in focus, usually accompanied by specific linkages drawn to other themes. For instance, information tends to be qualified as 'bad' or 'unclear' in relation to expressing discontent or blaming the government. However, in relation to one's own uncertainty in judging the referendum proposal, the predominant description is 'contradictory'. In conjecture with own information searches, finally, it is qualified as 'false', typically followed by a reference to oneself voting in favor. Still, information is consensually judged as low quality and insufficient. In a few cases, focus shifts also imply shifts in evaluation. For instance, 'open borders' tend to be positively evaluated and associated with traveling, living, and working abroad. However, if raised in the context of security, open borders become a threat because criminals and migrants can travel

and operate unobstructed. Different valences within the same cluster almost always stem from different foci; only in one case, participants evaluate the very same proposition differently. The notion of a closely integrated, state-like Union raises hopes amongst some, and fear amongst others.

Network maps in juxtaposition

Participants' explanations of individual and collective vote choices show some marked differences. Explanations of the referendum outcome are less diverse, while most connections made are somewhat stronger. Figure 1 shows the cluster structure of participants' accounts for their individual vote choice, and the collective outcome. Seven clusters present in explanations of individual decision vanish in accounts of the collective vote choice, while two new clusters appear. Unsurprisingly, most positively valenced clusters disappear or are considerably less prominent with regard to the (negative) referendum outcome. Concerns with progressing European integration, or Europe as a powerful global player and democratic entity, are seen as irrelevant to the majority of No-voters. Apart from that, most knowledge- and uncertainty-related considerations, as well as doubts about the feasibility of further integration, are attributed to individual, but not collective vote choices. Instead, some abstract economic considerations, as well as worries about Dutch sovereignty, are seen as relevant for other people's choices, but not raised in the individ-


Figure 1. *Mapped clusters in accounts of individual voting decisions and the referendum outcome.*

ual context. The euro- and surrender-clusters show considerably more weight and complexity in explanations of others' voting decisions.

Moreover, while some clusters (concerning government arrogance, negative feelings, bad information, as well as simplifying effects of EU integration) appear largely unchanged in both conditions, others are profoundly re-organized. A small cluster discussing the EU as a bureaucratic 'water head' changes in content, valence, and alignment. In explaining the referendum outcome, this cluster contains the common Euro-bureaucracy stereotype (e. g., Medrano, 2003) as well as complaints about costs and frictions. Apart from the referendum outcome, this cluster is linked to the united Europe cluster, as well as another cluster discussing the desirability of the common market for larger and smaller economies. In explaining individual vote choice, however, both links disappear, as do the components regarding costs and frictions. Instead, the Draft Constitution is made relevant to the cluster as potentially reducing bureaucracy and increasing efficiency. In accordance with this frame shift, the negative valence switches to hopes for improvement. Another cluster that differs strongly between the conditions is the discussion of party cues. These occasionally justify individual Yes-voting by citing most parties' endorsement of the Constitution. However, when explaining the outcome, the centrist parties are eclipsed entirely, while the rejection by two fringe parties provides a negative party cue.

Similar differences in framing occur also within some otherwise stable clusters. Most notably, the surrender cluster (stably causally related to the feelings cluster) is, in the individual context, mainly concerned with the Dutch influence in Europe. With regard to the referendum outcome, however, this is replaced by worries about Dutch national identity, objectified in a number of 'achievements' such as gay marriage, abortion laws and soft drugs tolerance. The prototypical objectification of the European threat is, consensually, the Euro, which has already taken away the Dutch Guilder, another identity symbol. Thereby, the surrender- and euro- clusters become closely related around a common identity-threat-frame, which is said to be relevant to others' voting decisions. Also connected to others' reasoning only is political cynicism, which generalizes and escalates from the specific disinterest and doubts some participants admit for themselves. A similar generalization occurs within the labor cluster. In the individual condition, this cluster contains personal worries about employment, and the personified threat by cheap (always Polish) labor migrants. At the collective level, this is extended to a general fear of globalization, liberalization, and social retrenchments, while the personalization is dropped. The complete list of occurring frames and clusters can be found in the appendix.

Bases of arguments

Assessing the thematic range of clusters, only a minority concerns (claimed) implications of the European Constitution (e. g., democracy, labor, security, surrender). By far the most, and also the most salient issues discussed pertain to experiential observations during the referendum campaign. This is followed by a group of clusters reflecting popular wisdom about previous steps of European integration (Medrano, 2003; Scheuer, 2005). These themes are, however, sometimes made relevant indirectly. One way of doing this is to portray them as symptomatic for general problems, such as political unresponsiveness, disregard towards the people, or the intransparency of EU politics. Another connection works via the feelings cluster and justifies voting based on general (usually dis-) content with perceived dynamics in Europe. Interestingly, the debatable quality of the euro as reason for (no-) voting seems to be clear to most participants. Statements regularly qualify the euro as invalid reason, followed by the reservation that "it was still relevant somehow".

Common themes and social representations

Tracing back propositions to their authors, it becomes visible that only some themes are shared by almost all participants. Particularly in explanations of the referendum outcome, where several personally important clusters disappear, more weight is given to common knowledge explanations (e. g., Sovereignty and Economy, both unrelated to individual votes). Five of the stable clusters form the common ground of most participants' understandings: The euro, the government, and worries about Dutch identity (surrender cluster) give rise to a feeling of discontent, which is made responsible for the outcome. Apart from that, bad information was unable to persuade people, confusing and enraging even positively predisposed voters. With the exception of the identity theme, the same pattern emerges also from the individual explanations. There, a strong role of one's own unsatisfactory knowledge and uncertainty appears next to the information cluster.

Amongst these core clusters, the euro cluster shows by far the broadest range of shared connections. It is associated with strong negative feelings and economic disadvantages, while its contribution to simplified traveling is admitted just as consensually. Also, its (contested) relevance to the EU Constitution is salient in all conditions. By contrast, in the government cluster, participants only agree that it caused discontent; what or who exactly is held responsible varies between participants. Outside the network core, several other shortcut connections are also shared widely.

Parties are perceived as taking controversial, if not contradictory stances, participants describe themselves as actively seeking information, and people have no influence on anything.

Divided themes and intentional construction

Both within and outside these shared themes, Yes- and No-voters selectively referred to different frames and clusters. For example, hopes that the EU Constitution might reduce bureaucracy appear repeatedly in Yes-voters' statements, but no No-voter mentions this theme. Indeed, the whole bureaucracy cluster is only mentioned by Yes-voters. This holds true even in explaining the referendum outcome, where the theme gets a decidedly negative twist. Furthermore, another cluster, stressing a need to stand united as a global economic or political power, is also almost exclusively raised by Yes-voters, and common amongst these. Less common, but also a pure domain of Yes-voters is the democracy cluster. Similarly, discussions of what the EU Constitution actually is, contains, and implies for enhanced cooperation are dominated by Yes-voters.

Perhaps more surprisingly, the same can be said about most of the euro cluster. As figure 2 shows, Yes-voters agree that the euro caused discontent, and was an important, if formally invalid, reason for many voters. The No-voters, by contrast, contribute the economic disadvantage and identity themes to the cluster. Both camps agree that there is also a simplifying effect.


Figure 2. *Construction analysis of the euro cluster and its neighborhood.*

Within the information cluster, contributions are just as sharply divided. No-voters predominantly criticize information for coming too late, being too little, and of bad quality. Particularly the first two aspects are stressed exclusively by No-voters. Yes-voters, by contrast, use attributes such as dry, contradictory, and plainly false. Also, they refer to specific topics that they would have desired more information about, whereas No-voters tend to refer to information in general. A similar division occurs in the government cluster. Yes-voters tend to specify concrete culprits (mainly the prime minister), as well as specific culpable behavior, such as not taking people seriously. No-voters refer more generally to 'the way' how 'Dutch politics' conducted the whole campaign. Interestingly, however, No-voters are much more specific about politicians' reactions to the referendum outcome, stressing particularly that the failure had caught them unprepared.

The part of the network which is most dominated by No-voters is the nexus of negative feelings, uncertainty, and oneself. More than two third of all self-related propositions are made by No-voters. These describe themselves as not convinced by the bad information, doubtful about the utility, necessity, and feasibility of the whole project, and intuitively predisposed against it. Doubts about the feasibility are usually justified citing European diversity, conflicting interests, and identities. At the same time, the current state of affairs is implicitly qualified as acceptable, rendering grand designs for future integration unnecessary. At any rate, they prefer the current state to a perspective of uncertain changes or, as one participant put it:

> "Ik stem gewoon tegen want dan heb ik inderdaad die zekerheid, het blijft gewoon zo."
>
> ["I simply vote against, because then I am certain that it stays the same"; Claire[13], Student, No-voter]

Idiosyncratic themes and personal concerns

These recurring patterns notwithstanding, an analysis of individual contributions reveals a range of consistent idiosyncrasies. The clustering procedure generated on average three (one to four) recurring themes per participant, accounting for more than half[14] of a person's coded contributions. Accounts of participants with higher interest were somewhat more complex (involving more clusters), and better integrated (fewer unaccounted-for statements) than those of disinterested participants. While some individual themes overlapped with the co-constructed clusters introduced above, others deviated clearly from the shared understanding. For instance, one participant (Willemijn, white collar, No-

voter) seemed very concerned with the roles of countries in the EU, applying this perspective to discussions of economic benefits, diverging interests and identities, and even knowledge. Another participant (Henk, blue collar, No-voter) repeatedly referred to migration topics, connecting this theme to cheap laborers, crime, and open borders. Other preoccupations matched those clusters already described. For example, Martijn (senior, Yes-voter) mainly referred to the euro in all its facets, and the power cluster. The breadth of idiosyncratic themes varied from simple buzzwords reliably provided in almost any context (e. g., security; Emma, student, No-voter) to elaborate themes with multiple connections also to other clusters (e. g., Sjoerd, white collar, Yes-voter, connected the EU Draft Constitution to expected improvements in European democracy, the current status quo as well as people's influence). The same participant's idiosyncratic themes often represented detached or even contrary considerations. For instance, Lies (blue collar, Yes-voter) focused repeatedly on national identities threatened by European integration, while also stressing the benefits of enhanced cooperation.

These personal themes are highly selective and go beyond shared understandings in two main ways. First, explicit weighting of discussed themes seems to be bound to individual preferences. Other than intentional construction, which relies on attaching salience to different aspects of clusters, idiosyncratic weighting allows subjective choices based on the very same considerations. Second, individuals highlight particular aspects and elaborate on their connections to the set of common understandings. By this means, they also add considerations which may be novel, or in disagreement with others' perceptions. In both cases, but particularly in the latter, idiosyncratic contributions are usually legitimized by references to specific expertise or anecdotes. Participants provide additional information to justify why not commonly shared beliefs might be highly salient, or more valid than others. Both direct disqualifications of others' arguments and elaborations to support one's own point of view are markedly more prevalent amongst the Yes-voters.

Discussion

Schematic knowledge and shared beliefs

The results show that, despite their confessed low knowledge and interest, most participants constructed rather complex and systematic understandings of the European Draft Constitution. Without judging the adequacy of people's reasoning (Fossum and Trenz, 2006; Hobolt, 2007), it is clear that judgments were neither random, nor unfounded. All participants contributed to creating some shared understanding, and all but

two exhibited organized belief systems also within their own contributions. Both idiosyncratic and co-constructed clusters show most qualities expected from cognitive schemata. They group thoughts based on semantic relatedness, forming relatively stable and coherent representations. Their internal integration is dense and semantically rich, while towards other clusters they behave as wholes, summarizing general relations between themes, or drawing vague associations. Furthermore, these schematic structures group considerations with similar emotional 'tags' (Kumlin, 2000; Lodge and Taber, 2000), which support ambiguity avoidance in judgment. Indeed, participants referring to schemas containing differently charged considerations usually covered *either* positive *or* negative elements.

Occurring judgments were mostly consensual, describing what is commonly accepted as good or bad for certain actors, or enshrined as commonly (dis-)advantageous in the underlying social representations. Controversy derived almost entirely from selectivity highlighting different aspects of a theme. Participants controversially framed uncontroversial 'facts'. Focusing on different subsets of the shared knowledge and drawing in different contexts, participants arrived at different evaluations from the same beliefs. Substantive disagreements over evaluations of the very same belief were extremely rare, supporting Aarts and van der Kolk's (2005) view that the referendum revealed not different preferences, but different interpretations. This also resonates with the scarcity of moral or value judgments typical for politicized controversy (Gamson, 1992).

Participants used frames strategically in their accounts, stressing considerations matching their respective argumentation lines (Brewer and Gross, 2005). They introduced frames sustaining their deviant reading even while acknowledging other frames currently present in the debate. Apparently, the social representations forming people's common understandings easily accommodated contrary frames[15] more easily than was expected from literature. Participants were often also willing to accept different interpretations. For example, nobody objected to qualifying information as 'false', a crucial element of a frame discarding most of No-voters' fears as unfounded. Generally, contrary frames involving similar contexts were hardly contested. Rather, people simply gave a different twist to a similar narrative (e. g., subsuming 'false' under 'unreliable' information, thus justifying a No-vote by the lack of persuasive arguments). People argued more about entirely different summoned contexts; for example whether the euro related to identity or economic concerns.

Particularly cultural knowledge about the euro proved to be extremely multifaceted. Most participants shared frames indicating both personal and general, positive and negative implications, from domains as diverse

as identity, economy, everyday life, national and European politics. Apparently, people's understandings of European politics depend to a large degree on relatively concretely objectified knowledge. While most common EU-stereotypes and abstract principles were only weakly integrated in people's accounts (e. g., the clusters bureaucracy, power, economy), the central considerations mainly dealt with rather tangible, and directly self-related information such as uncertainty, discontent with the euro, or 'European experiences' (Bruter, 2004).

Goal-directed, idiosyncratic, and integrated construction

While participants hardly disagreed about the valence of made arguments, they occasionally debated their validity or importance. This resonates with the view that framing affects the weight given to different considerations in casting a decision, rather than the content of these considerations (Brewer and Gross, 2005; Nelson and Oxley, 1999). Participants often had a range of considerations available, even introducing contrary perspectives themselves. Shifting frames, they arrived at a preferred interpretation by selectively discounting and highlighting considerations. People maintained coherence and evaluations in their understandings by selecting frames and contexts carrying matching valence (Axelrod, 1973; Berinsky and Kinder, 2006; Brewer and Gross, 2005). Coherence was even achieved by Yes-voters accounting for the negative referendum outcome. By reframing their own considerations, they arrived at accounts reconciling their beliefs with the contrary choice of the majority of No-voters. Additionally, they already portray their own vote choice much more as a weighted decision, thus acknowledging valid arguments for the other side. However, Yes-voters' offered reasons for No-voting tend to be considerations that are easily unmasked as 'invalid' or unconvincing. They even suggest reasons hardly named by No-voters themselves, attributing superficially plausible, but mislead considerations to these. Accordingly, they see the outcome as caused by a majority falling for populist propaganda, or yielding to frustration with aspects peripheral to the referendum. The same considerations, strategically reframed, could be used both to explain the negative outcome, and to justify a positive vote (de Vreese and Semetko, 2004). Clearly, people retain considerable discretion over their use of cues from their information environment (Druckman, 2001; Druckman and Nelson, 2003).

The same degree of strategic integration pervades the way people reflect their idiosyncratic interests in their constructions. Most notably, personal concerns affect which elements from the commonly shared understandings are made central in people's accounts. People link their interests to information learned from mediatized social representations.

They cite events and examples from the public discourse, but embed them in different ways in their own narratives (Schaap, 2006; Shen, 2004). This 'integrated resource strategy' (Gamson, 1992), however, only partially relies on actual experiences. Rather, people 'experienced' the same referendum and sense making process quite differently, as they were trying to find out how the project related to their personal concerns (Lang and Lang, 1990). Reliance on such personal experiences was notably more prevalent amongst No-voters (see also de Vreese and Semetko, 2004).

Yes-voters were more likely to reflect the media discourse. They relied more on shared understandings, and used more balanced arguments and trade offs reflecting themes prominent in broadcasting (Gamson, 1992). For instance, both media and Yes-voters linked the Draft Constitution closely to its expected consequences for European integration, while simultaneously highlighting the lousiness of information provided to the voters (Schuck and de Vreese, 2008). Yes-voters largely followed the themes central to the media discourse, while No-voters were more selective and often focused on peripheral themes. They were, as Gamson predicts for users of integrated resource strategies, "constrained by omissions from the media discourse, but relatively immune to differences in the relative prominence of visible frames." (1992: 180; see also Edy and Meirick, 2007). Themes imported from outside the media mostly reflected popular wisdom generated, arguably, in previous decades of EU coverage (e. g., EU bureaucracy, simplified traveling; Hewstone, 1986; Medrano, 2003; Scheuer, 2005).

Summing up, participants showed remarkable sophistication in linking common understandings with their personal concerns. They constructed personalized situation models, which forged available information resources to support unique evaluations. To create coherent understandings from the 'blooming, buzzing confusion', people strategically selected frames from their information environment, and reframed contrary arguments to fit their constructions. While media discourse and popular wisdom largely delimited the range of raised elements, individuals retained considerable control over how they connected these. By selecting, weighting, and (re-) framing information, they created well-organized and coherent understandings of the EU Constitutional referendum. Combining knowledge from different sources, they managed to come to systematic preferences despite their evident lack of relevant information (Karp et al., 2005).

Limitations

Obviously, this study is subject to several limitations. First of all, while literature recommends adding focus groups until contributions become

redundant, the observed sample fell short of this requirement. Also, more confidence could be gained from comparing sense making in different information environments; juxtaposing, for instance, the French referendum. Given different social representations and higher politicization (Milner, 2006), people might use sense making strategies missed here. Also, better control of the information resources available for construction would be desirable to strengthen the above findings. Without an analysis of the information environment during the referendum campaign, the assignment of patterns to sources remains highly dependent on theory (de Vreese and Semetko, 2004). Likewise, any generalization from those patterns consistently turned up in this study carries only as far as we do not have theoretical reasons to expect deviant patterns elsewhere. While the pursued highly systematic analytic strategy effectively addresses the danger of exaggerating anecdotal findings, it cannot substitute for deficits in the theoretical conceptualization of individuals' sense making.

Conclusion

As the present study shows, people command a rich variety of strategies to use available information. They actively construct meaning, utilizing provided cues and frames. Their understandings are informed and constrained, but by no means determined, by public discourse. Consequently, research in political reasoning and communication needs to take audiences' active constructions more into account. On the one hand, investigations of message effects, or comprehension of political facts, may miss the amazing complexity of interacting cues available to people in real-life situations. Our lacking understanding of how people select, weigh, and frame information calls for the move towards a stronger audience perspective on the political public sphere. On the other hand, research designs could benefit from a more explicit modelling of how communicated information is processed. Models of cognition populate the theory sections of many studies in political communication, but they are usually discarded in the research designs (see Berinsky and Kinder, 2006, for a notable exception). We have argued above that many theories of context-dependent comprehension and communication effects can be integrated into a network-based model of thought and meaning. Connectionist approaches have informed rich methodology in cognitive and social psychology, and may prove promising to supplement and extend framing research into more realistic, complex, and interactive settings. Obviously, one necessary next step includes the application of mathematical network analysis techniques, which will enable processing of also larger-scale data in similarly fine grain. Formalizing the structures un-

derlying rich, context-bound interpretations, while simultaneously linking up with larger patterns of societal and media discourse, we might gain a more encompassing, and coherent, understanding of sense making.

Notes

1. Nonverbal communication is, for most parts, non-propositional. Since the mapping approach relies on propositional networks, non-propositional data cannot be treated adequately here.
2. Statements were regarded as relevant if they were explicitly related to the discussed subject matter, or raised in direct response to questions, also if the nature of relevance remained unclear (Grice, 1975; see also Mishler, 1986).
3. a) *the* Draft EU Constitution, b) *a* Constitution for the EU, c) a kind of legal document, d) an (unspecified) actual national Constitution, or e) a specified one. For details the code book can be obtained from the authors.
4. See also Mishler, 1986, for a similar test.
5. Specifically, this network type involves named, directed links and treats concepts, not propositions as nodes (for reviews see Kintsch, 1998; Raaijmakers and Shiffrin, 1992). Propositions are represented as dyads of linked concepts, or longer paths across the net. Links can be associative or dissociative (Read, Vanman, and Miller, 1997, see below).
6. All complex statements can be split into such dyadic micropropositions (Kintsch, 1998); e. g., "The Constitution is a bad compromise" can be notated as [Constitution]−is a−[Compromise] and [Compromise]−quality−[bad]. Such propositions, rather than concepts, are the minimal unit of sense making, (Holyoak and Thagard, 1995).
7. Mostly references to preceding thoughts. When referred-to actors were unspecified, this was coded accordingly (e. g., We, They). Irresolvable references other than actors are rare as such sentences would be incomprehensible.
8. action, causality, conduciveness, desire/goal, possibility/capability
9. object relation, category relation, possession/attribute relation
10. codes retrieved: Vote Yes, Vote No, Result, and the question sections 2.2 and 3.1
11. These two maps were closely interrelated, and therefore analyzed jointly.
12. This definition is analogous to Watts and Strogatz' (1998) "clustering coefficient" in network analysis.
13. All names changed. First letters indicate groups: A−F: Students, G−L: Blue Collar, M−S: Senior, T−Z: White Collar
14. 55% (25−100%) of a person's statements contained at least one concept from idiosyncratic clusters; 39% (20−58%) of all codes were covered. In two cases, only one cluster could be identified, covering 20/26% of codes, 33/40% of statements, respectively; in the other cases, clusters covered on average 13% of codes, 19% of statements.
15. These were not directly "opposing" frames (Druckman, 2001; Edy and Meirick, 2007), but frames suggesting opposing interpretations, without being mutually exclusive. The list of recurring frames can be found in the appendix.

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Appendix

Co-constructed clusters and frames occurring within these.

Cluster	Frame	Valence	Complexity	Integration	Sources	Neighbouring clusters	Vote Choice	Out-come
GOV Government	Arrogance and pushing through	−	+	+	(+)	INF EUR DEM	x	x
	Balkenende's blunders	−	o	o	(+)	INF	x	x
	Distrust and cynicism	−	−	−	−	FEE		x
	Moral threat	−	o	−			x	
INF Information	Provision: little, bad and too late	−	o	+	−	GOV PRO UNC	x	x
	Quality: conflicting and unclear	−	o	+	(−)	GOV PAR UNC	x	x
	Reliability: false	−	−	o	+	ECO EUR SUR	x	
	Neutrality: biased	−	−	+		GOV PAR UNC	x	x
	Guidance: unanimity	+	−	−		PAR	x	
EUR Euro	Consequences: more expensive	−	o	−	−		x	x
	Influence: delayed euro referendum	(−)	−	o		DEM GOV	x	x
	Utility: practical	+	+	+		SIM	x	x
	Identity: loss of symbol	−	+	+	−	SUR		x
	Invalid yet relevant for vote	+/−	−	o	+	PRO FEE	x	x
LAB Labor	Cheap labor migration	−	o	−	−	FEE	x	
	Liberalization and retrenchment	−	o	o		FEE ECO		x
SUR Surrender	Influence and independence	−	−	−	(−)	FEE	x	
	Identity	−	+	+	−	FEE PAR PRO EUR		x
SEC Security	Cooperative security	+	−	o	+	PRO	x	
	Immigration and crime	−	o	o	−	SIM FEE	x	
NEC Necessity	Performance of EU	(+)	−	−		PRO	x	x
POS Possibility	Further integration/implementation	(−)	+	−	−	UNI UNC	x	

(continued)

Cluster	Frame	Valence	Complexity	Integration	Sources	Neighbouring clusters	Vote Choice	Outcome
ENL Enlargement	Influence on acceding countries	+	o	–	+		x	
POW Power	Unite to gain political power	+	o	–	+	UNI	x	
	Unite for global competition	+	–	–	+	UNI	x	
DEM Democracy	Transparency and accountability	+	o	–	+	PRO	x	
	Institutional weights	+	–	–	+	PRO	x	
	People's influence	(+)	–	–		EUR	x	(x)
BUR Bureaucracy	Hopes for less bureauc. and efficiency	+	–	–	+	PRO	x	
	Eurocracy and costs	–	o	o	+	UNI ECO		x
PRO Progress	Not much change anyway	+		–	+	INF UNC	x	
	Streamlining the status quo	+		–	(+)	DEM	x	
	Enhanced cooperation in policy	+	+	o	–	NEC SEC	x	
	The Constitution is …	o	o	–	(+)	SUR EUR	x	x
PAR Party Cues	Controversy	o	–	–		INF	x	x
	SP and CU	–	–	–		INF SUR		x
	Unanimity	+	–	–		INF	x	
FEE Feelings	Discontent	–	–	–	(–)	INF GOV EUR	x	x
	Intuition	–	–	–	–		x	
	Worries	–	–	–	(–)	SUR LAB	x	
UNC Uncertainty	Doubts	–	–	O	(–)	INF POS PRO	x	
	Risk-averse No-voting	–	–	–	–		x	
UND Understanding	No knowledge	–	–	o		UNC INF PRO	x	x
SIM Simplify	Travel, work, and pay abroad	+	+	o		EUR PRO	x	x
	Simplify immigration	(–)	–	–	(–)	SEC	x	

(*continued*)

Cluster	Frame	Valence	Complexity	Integration	Sources	Neighbouring clusters	Vote Choice	Out-come
ENL Enlargement	Influence on acceding countries	+	o	–	+		x	
ECO Economy	Which countries benefit	–/(+)	+	–		PRO LAB		x
SOV Sovereignty	Endangered sovereignty	–	–	–				x
UNI United Europe	No United States of Europe	–	o	–	(–)	POW POS	x	x
	A closer union	+	–	–	(+)	POW NEC	x	x

Note. In the "Valence" column, + and – indicate positive and negative valence. In the "Complexity" and "Integration" columns, +, o, and – indicate high, medium, and low internal frame complexity, and integration with other clusters outside the frame. In the "Source" column, + and – indicate mainly Yes- or No-voters using that frame. The crosses in the last column show whether framesoccurred in accounts of individual or collective votes.